1. The forces of natural and sexual selection shaped the human brain over millions of years. These processes have produced evolved psychological mechanisms in uenced by both genes and culture.
2. For the vast majority of human history, we lived as hunter-gathers. Our mental mechanisms evolved in the context of this environment of evolutionary adaptation. As Cosmides and Tooby (1997) put it, "Our modern skulls house a stone age mind." 3. Our ancestors confronted sets of speci c problems (avoiding predation, nding food, detecting liars, attracting mates). Thus, the human brain is not a general-purpose problem solver. Rather, our minds are composed of somewhat separate modules that have evolved to deal with various adaptive problems. In other words, the mind is "domain speci c."
Not surprisingly, evolutionary psychology is controversial and has been criticized on methodological, theoretical and political grounds (Rose & Rose, 2000) . However, as illustrated by increased coverage in introductory psychology textbooks and courses taught in psychology departments, the eld rapidly is joining the intellectual mainstream. In this essay, I brie y discuss three intellectually exciting Darwinian ideas that are particularly germane to the study of human-animal interactions.
Biophilia
In a slim volume, Harvard zoologist Wilson (1984) argued that, as a group, humans possess biophilia, a trait he de ned as, "the innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes" (p. 1). Wilson's hypothesis has caught on; several recent books on the psychology of human-animal relationships and many Internet sites feature it prominently. The idea is powerful. It is comforting to think that humans have a built-in respect for the natural world. But is this idea tenable? I think not.
The problem is domain speci city. On the plains of Africa, the environment in which our species originally evolved, some animals were helpers (wild canids who may have warned against predators or cleaned up the garbage around the campsite), some were foes (large carnivores, venomous snakes), and still others were prey. I nd it unlikely that a mental module endowing early humans with a general respect for other life forms would have adaptive value. On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that our ancestors evolved behavioral tendencies to t the different types of interactions they had with various types of animals. Hence, as typi ed by the adverse reactions people typically have toward snakes and spiders, our interactions with other species can be "biophobic" as well as biophilic (Ulrich, 1992) . As Kellert (1993) has pointed out, our attitudes toward other creatures are often utilitarian, domininionistic, and negativistic.
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In reality, there is little evidence to support Wilson's (1984) In a more recent treatment he wrote, "Biophilia is not a single instinct but a complex of learning rules that can be teased apart and analyzed individually" (Wilson, 1993, p. 31) . Perhaps it would be better to think of our interactions with animals as analogous to taxis -the term biologists use to describe the tendency of insects to orient toward (positive taxis) or away from (negative taxis) a category of stimuli. Attraction to exotic tropical reef sh would be an example of a positive biotaxis whereas spider phobias would exemplify a negative biotaxis. I would expect that these hypothetical approach/avoidance tendencies would-like our facility for language-have a genetic basis but also be modi ed readily by culture and experience. For me, the biophilia hypothesis remains just that-an hypothesis. However, it is an intriguing notion that will certainly spur research in human-animal interactions.
Anthropomorphism, Hunting, and Guilt
A second compelling evolutionary idea comes from Serpell (1996) . One of the more intriguing attributes of human-animal interactions is the inconsistency of our attitudes toward other species (Herzog, 1993) . Serpell argues that confusions in our moral stances toward animals ultimately stem from an intrinsic attribute of the human mind-a tendency to anthropomorphize. Humans, more than any other creature, have the capacity to imagine the perspective of others. Indeed, Tomasello (1999) has argued that the ability of early Homo sapiens to project themselves into the mental shoes of another being made the development of culture possible.
According to Serpell (1996) , the natural consequence of the ability to put your self into another person's (or another animal's) skin is empathy-hence, the moral crunch. Take hunting. Many (though not all) paleoanthropologists believe that for much of human history, hunting prowess was directly related to survival and reproductive success. A hunter who could think like a wild boar would be the one most likely to bring home the proverbial bacon. But the tendency for the hunter to project himself into the head of his prey leads him to empathize with the prey and, according to Serpell, feel guilty for killing the prey. He writes,
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Highly anthropomorphic perceptions of animals provide hunting peoples with a conceptual framework for understanding, identifying with, and antic- In essence, Serpell (1996) suggests that paradoxes in our attitudes toward other species stem from two con icting traits: (a) our natural predilection for animal esh and (b) our innate tendency to anthropomorphize, itself the product of an evolutionary experiment-the big brain. The result is that much of our thinking about the treatment of other species consists of intellectual shucking and jiving that rationalizes why, in our culture, pig meat is tasty and dog meat disgusting. Serpell's hunting-anthropomorphism-guilt hypothesis places paradoxes in our thinking about animals squarely within the domain of evolutionary psychology.
Memes, Animals, and Culture
My nal candidate for an innovative evolutionary theory of human-animal interactions is the meme, an idea initially proposed in a groundbreaking book by evolutionary biologist Dawkins (1976) . Memes are the cultural analogs of genes. Like genes, they are replicators, but their medium is oral tradition and imitation rather than spirals of DNA. To Dawkins, the organism is the "gene's way of making another gene" (Dawkins, 1982, p. 98) . But, when it comes to culture, the human mind is the meme's way of making another meme. For a fuller treatment of this idea, see Blackmore (1999) .
Let's apply meme thinking to a perennial question in anthrozoology-why pets? Numerous theories have been proposed to explain pet keeping (Serpell, 1996) . For example, it has been proposed that dogs are essentially parasites who have taken advantage of our parental instincts and in ltrated our liveslargely to their advantage, not to ours. From a canine perspective, I suppose it would be correct to say, "humans are the dog's genes' way of making more dog genes." The memes-eye view of pet keeping, however, is a bit different. Memes offer a conceptual link between genetic and cultural evolution. For example, memes-not genes-are responsible for stag beetles having recently become popular pets in Japan, but not in the United States (Laurent, 2000) .
However, genes and memes can interact. The rise in popularity of competitive dog shows over the past 150 years has been a major factor in the extra- 
